Lifting the Veil: The Price Formation of Corporate Bond Offerings
Journal(s): Journal of Financial Economics
Published: June 30, 2021
Dr. Liying Wang, assistant professor of finance at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln College of Business, examines how the corporate bond offering price evolves in the primary market, where securities are created, before underwriters, who determine risk levels on transactions, allocate the bonds to investors. While a popular view is that corporate bonds are easy to price so that underwriters know all information they need, her research suggests this is not the case.
Strategic Estimation of Asset Fair Values
Journal(s): Journal of Accounting and Economics
Published: August 1, 2018
When estimating the fair value, the unbiased estimate of the potential market price, some managers may inflate these numbers when self-estimated due to the unobservable nature of the value. Insurers who need to appear financially healthy often choose to self-estimate their fair value, which research suggests, may need regulation that is more detailed.
Vote Avoidance and Shareholder Voting in Mergers and Acquisitions
Journal(s): The Review of Financial Studies
Published: June 8, 2018
Dr. Julie Wu, assistant professor of finance, investigates the function of acquirer shareholder voting during mergers and acquisitions. This study shows acquirers with low institutional ownership, high deal risk and high agency costs are more likely to bypass shareholder voting, leading to lower announcement returns and higher offers.