Tan is an applied microeconomic theorist. His research interests are in industrial organization and organizational economics, focusing on the role of information in shaping incentives in these settings. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia University in 2017. He currently teaches the microeconomic core courses to all incoming graduate students, and he also teaches game theory and intermediate microeconomics to undergraduates.
- "Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection" (with Anh Nguyen). American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023. (PDF)
- "Optimal Transparency of Monitoring Capability." Journal of Economic Theory, 2023. (PDF)
- "Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Messages" (with Anh Nguyen). Journal of Economic Theory, 2021. (PDF)
- "Assignment under Task Dependent Private Information." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021. (PDF)
- "Knowledge as Property Rights under the Ratchet Effect of Innovation." Journal of the European Economic Association, 2019. (PDF)
- "Information Control in the Hold-up Problem" (with Anh Nguyen). RAND Journal of Economics, 2019. (PDF)
Selected Working Papers