Price Discrimination and Economic Journals

An analysis of pricing by economics journal publishers shows that most publishers initially charge libraries and individual subscribers the same price. Over time, however, almost all eventually engage in price discrimination. The few publishers that never price-discriminate seem to be purchasing an explicit non-profit-maximizing pricing strategy. Once discrimination occurs, library prices rise faster than individual subscriber prices. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions.

Publication Information
Article Title: Price Discrimination and Economic Journals
Journal: Applied Economics (1997)
v. 29 pp. 1611-618
Author(s): Rosenbaum, David I;  Ye, Meng-Hua
Researcher Information
Rosenbaum, David I
Rosenbaum, David I
  • Forensic Economics
  • Applied Microeconomics
  • Cost-Benefit Analysis
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